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Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome in Kentucky
INTRODUCTION
In the past, a major obstacle faced by child sexual abuse victims was
society's refusal to acknowledge that adults might actually be having sex
with children.' Although societal awareness of the problem of child
sexual abuse has since increased dramatically,2 this increased recognition
has resulted in new psychological and legal problems for child sexual
abuse victims. A child who alleges that she is a victim of sexual abuse
must deal with a criminal justice system unprepared for the unique
burden of proof problems present in child sexual abuse cases3 and a
mental health profession still in the process of understanding how sexual
abuse affects a child's emotions and behavior.'
' See Jon R. Conte, The Therapist in Child Sexual Abuse: The Context of Helping, 51 NEw
DIREC'IONS FOR MENTAL. HEALTH SERvIcES 87, 87-88 (1991) (providing possible reasons why adult
sexual abuse of children was not recognized as a serious problem among professionals until the mid-
1970s).
'According to one report, the United States has experienced a 322% increase in reported cases
of child sexual abuse since 1980. Teena Sorenson & Barbara Snow, How Children Tell: The Process
of Disclosure in Child Sexual Abuse, 70 CHILD WELFARE 3, 3 (1991) (citing NATIONAL CENTER ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEcr, STUDY OF NAT'L INCDENCE AND PREVALENcE OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLEcr (1988)).
'See Tausha L. Bradshaw & Alan E. Marks, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Factors That
Influence the Legal Disposition of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 36 CRIME & DELINQUENcY 276, 276
(Apr. 1990).
' See, eg., Joseph H. Beitchman et al., A Review of the Short-Term Effects of Child Sexual
Abuse, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 537 (1991) (reviewing 42 studies that examined the short-term
effects of child sexual abuse); Roberta A. Hibbard & Georgia L. Hartman, Behavioral Problems in
Alleged Sexual Abuse Victims, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 755 (1992) (comparing the incidence
of reported behavioral indicators of sexual abuse in a group of alleged sexual abuse victims with that
of a non-abused group); Sylvia B. Patten et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and the Treatment of
Sexual Abuse, 34 SOCIAL WORK 197, 197 (1989) (recognizing similarities between the symptoms
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The standard of proof applicable to all criminal cases requires that the
prosecution, in order to obtain a conviction, prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.' In child sexual abuse cases, a variety of
factors make this standard of proof an extremely difficult one for the
prosecution to meet. First, physical or medical evidence of the sexual
abuse is rare.' As a result, the prosecution's evidence often consists solely
of the word of the child. Second, the fact that the child may not have
immediately reported the abuse casts doubt on her claim.' Finally,
victims sometimes surprise prosecutors by recanting their accusations!
Like prosecutors, mental health professionals face special problems in
dealing with child sexual abuse victims. In order to provide effective
treatment to these child victims, professionals need guidance concerning the
effects of sexual abuse on the victim. In response to this need, Dr. Roland C.
Summit introduced the phrase "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome," or "CSAAS," to refer to five behavioral characteristics that he
found to be common among sexually abused children.9 Summit intended for
CSAAS to provide therapists with a model for treatment of child sexual abuse
victims, and to aid therapists in accepting, rather than challenging, the child's
allegations." Although Summit intended for CSAAS to be used solely as a
therapeutic tool, prosecutors with burden of proof problems have presented
expert testimony on CSAAS at trial in order to explain a victim's behavior to
a jury," to rehabilitate a victim's credibility, 2 and even to prove affirma-
tively that a child was abused. 3 Consequently, the admissibility of expert
exhibited by child sexual abuse victims and the symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder).
'In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
' Bradshaw & Marks, supra note 3, at 277, 283.
7 Id. at 277.
1 Id. at 276-77.
'Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 177, 177-78 (1983). These common characteristics of sexually abused children have also
been labeled as "child sexual abuse syndrome," "sexual abuse syndrome" and "victim accommodation
syndrome." For the purposes of this Note, the term "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome"
[hereinafter CSAAS] will be used. The five characteristics of CSAAS are discussed infra note 22 and
accompanying text
10Id. at 179-80.
" State v. Dodson, 452 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (discussing expert testimony that
explained why the child acted normally around the alleged abuser); People v. Wellman, 560 N.Y.S.2d
643, 644 (App. Div. 1990) (discussing expert testimony that explained the child's failure to
immediately identify the defendant as an abuser), appeal denied, 578 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1991); State
v. Sims, 608 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Vt. 1991) (discussing expert testimony that explained why the child
continued to visit the house in which the defendant lived and in which the alleged abuse occurred).
" People v. Housley, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 437 (Ct. App. 1992) (allowing expert testimony to
explain why the child may have falsely recanted her claim of abuse).
" People v. Knupp, 579 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (App. Div. 1992) (disallowing expert testimony on
CSAAS when "introduced primarily to prove that [abuse] took place"); State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d
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testimony on CSAAS has become a center of controversy. 4 While the
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of admissibility
allow the testimony for limited purposes, 5 Kentucky represents the
minority view on this issue in that it absolutely rejects expert testimony
on CSAAS or any of its separate symptoms.'
This Note analyzes Kentucky's approach to the admissibility of expert
testimony on CSAAS. Part I examines the results of scientific research
on the existence of CSAAS."7 Part II discusses three evidentiary issues
that commonly arise when expert testimony on CSAAS is admitted."
Part III reviews approaches that courts have taken in admitting expert
testimony on CSAAS, and presents Kentucky's refusal to admit such
testimony as an illustration of the minority approach. 9 Part IV analyzes
Kentucky's rationale for ruling CSAAS testimony inadmissible. ° The
Note concludes that Kentucky should continue to reject expert testimony
on CSAAS as a whole, but should admit expert testimony on two
symptoms of CSAAS when presented independently of the syndrome.2
I. THE EXIsTENCE OF CSAAS
CSAAS consists of the following five categories of behavior: (1)
secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4)
delayed, conflicted and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction.'
Knowledge and understanding of the elements of the syndrome are
necessary so that adults will avoid the tendency to blame an "uncertain,
604, 609 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that CSAAS could not be used to establish whether or not
abuse had actually occurred).
" See generally John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68
Nan. L. REv. 1 (1989) (providing a comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis of the proper use of
expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases); Andrew Cohen, Note, The Unreliability of Expert
Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEo. L.J. 429 (1985)
(emphasizing the failure of expert testimony on characteristics of sexual abuse victims to meet the
federal standards of admissibility); Chandra L Holmes, Note, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
S)mdrome: Curing the Effects of a Misdiagnosis in the Law of Evidence, 25 TuLSA L.J. 143 (1989)
(advocating the adoption of a standard of admissibility specifically tailored to CSAAS testimony
because of the jury's need for such testimony).
," See State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (stating that the use of
CSAAS evidence to explain reactions to abuse has "received nearly universal judicial approval in
other jurisdictions"), cer. granted, 606 A.2d 372 (NJ. 1992).
"See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 70-108 and accompanying text.
See fra notes 109-39 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
Sumnit, supra note 9, at 181.
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emotionally distraught child" who accuses "a respectable, reasonable
adult ... of perverse, assaultive behavior."'
The first two elements of CSAAS-secrecy and helplessness-relate
to the basic vulnerability of children.' Dr. Summit explains how the
secrecy surrounding the abuse becomes "both the source of fear and
the promise of safety"' to the child. The adult perpetrator takes
advantage of the authoritarian relationship with the child in order to
convince the child that the sexual activity should remain "our
secret." 6 In addition, the perpetrator can often use this authoritarian
relationship to avoid resistance from the childY.2 Because children are
taught to be compliant and loving to their caretakers, many child sexual
abuse victims feel helpless and see no choice but to "play possum" when
they are being abused.2
Once the sexual abuse occurs, a pattern normally develops in which
the perpetrator repeatedly abuses the child, sometimes for a period of
years. 29 At this point, the only alternative for the child, who feels that
she cannot report the abuse, is to accept and adapt to the situation." The
child then begins to experience the three elements of CSAAS that "are
sequentially contingent on sexual assault"--accommodation, delayed
disclosure and retraction." A child who accommodates to the situa-
tion may act out her anger and fear in other ways, such as through
substance abuse, multiple personalities, promiscuous sexual activity,
repeated runaways, and suicidal behavior. 2
When these accommodation mechanisms finally collapse, the
victim may disclose that she has been abused. However, this disclo-
sure may not occur until years after the abuse first began, causing
many adults to question the child's claim. A child faced with such
pressure, as well as accusations from others that she is the one who
is lying, will often decide that she would have been better off if she
had never reported the abuse. Consequently, the victim will retract her
allegation in the hopes that everything will return to "normal."'
, Id. at 178.
Id. at 177, 181, 182-83.
2Id. at 181.
u Id.
2Id. at 182.
n Id. at 183-84.
" Id. at 184.
"Id.
S, Id. at 177, 181.
,Id. at 184-86.
"Id. at 186.
Id. at 188.
. 730 [Vol. 81
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Summit intended his article on CSAAS to explain why aspects of a
victim's behavior may seem inconsistent with abuse.35 However, Summit
himself acknowledges that the complexity of the act of child sexual abuse
precludes a conclusion that every victim will exhibit every characteristic
of CSAAS, or that every child who does exhibit the symptoms of CSAAS
will be a victim of sexual abuse.' Rather than being definitive proof of
the occurrence of abuse, CSAAS merely "represents a common denomi-
nator of the most frequently observed victim behaviors."37
Summit's article on CSAAS has spurred a large body of research on
the question of whether child sexual abuse victims experience certain
symptoms with sufficient frequency and commonality to label the
symptoms a "syndrome." A relatively recent review of the existing
research on the short-term effects of child sexual abuse indicates that
"there does not appear to be sufficient evidence at this time to postulate
the existence of a unique 'sexual abuse syndrome' with a specific course
or outcome."38 The authors of the review note that a serious methodologi-
cal problem with the forty-two studies reviewed was the lack of
appropriate control groups. The resulting inability to compare the
behavior of the child sexual abuse victims with non-abused children
limits any "firm" conclusions about sexually abused children that could
be drawn from the review. 9
Although research supporting Summit's concept of a "syndrome" is
sparse, one study did provide support for Summit's conclusions concern-
ing both delayed disclosure and retraction." This research focused
specifically on children's reporting of abuse, and indicated that disclosure
for most child sexual abuse victims consists of a process, rather than a
definable event.4  Regarding delayed disclosure, "[t]he common
" Id. at 179.
Without a clear understanding of the accommodation syndrome, clinical specialists tend
to reinforce the comforting belief that children, are only rarely legitimate victims of
unilateral sexual abuse and that among the few complaints that surface, most can be
dismissed as fantasy, confusion, or a displacement of the child'sown wish for power and
seductive conquest.
Id.
Id. at 180.
37 Id.
" Beitchman et at., supra note 4, at 546. The American Psychiatric Association apparently
agrees with this conclusion as it has not included CSAAS in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-Ill-R), its official publication of recognized mental disorders. See
DiAGNosric AND STATISticAL MANUAL oF MENTAL DIsonlts (Amercian Psychiatric Association
ed., 3d ed. rev. 1987).
"Beitchman et al., supra note 4, at 551.
Sorenson & Snow, supra note 2, at 11.
" Id. This study was somewhat unique in that it was based solely on child sexual abuse cases
1992-93]
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presumption that most abused children are capable of immediate active
disclosure" 42 was not supported by the study in that "seventy-nine
percent of the children in this study initially denied their abuse or were
tentative in disclosing it."43 Furthermore, while twenty-two percent of
the victims eventually recanted their original allegations, the fact that
ninety-three percent of these victims later reaffrmned that the abuse had
occurred supports the concept of retraction as "a recognized phenomenon
in child sexual abuse cases.' ' 4
1I. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS
Introduction of CSAAS into the courtroom has led to an emotion-
al, heated debate45 that centers on a court's attempt to "vindicate the
right of one accused of child sexual abuse to a fair trial according to
accepted rules of evidence, while at once shielding the complainant
from undue additional trauma,. . . [and, at the same time, preserving]
the people's powerful interest in persistent prosecution of abusers. '
Thus, courts faced with expert testimony on CSAAS must evaluate the
testimony in light of numerous evidentiary concerns, as well as the
conflicting interests of the victim and the defendant. In particular,
expert testimony on CSAAS raises issues regarding the relevancy of
the testimony, the appropriate standard of admissibility, and whether
the testimony invades the province of the jury.
The threshold inquiry that a court must make in admitting any type of
evidence is determining whether that evidence is relevant.47 Relevant
evidence is that which is both material to the proceeding and probative."
that had been confirmed in one of three ways: (1) a confession or legal plea; (2) a criminal
conviction; or (3) medical evidence indicative of sexual abuse. Id. at 5.
42 Id. at 11.
4' Id. at 12.
"Id. at 14.
,Compare Holmes, supra note 14, at 169 (advocating the adoption of a standard of
admissibility specifically tailored to CSAAS testimony because of the jury's need for such testimony)
with Cohen, supra note 14, at 456 (emphasizing the failure of expert testimony on characteristics of
sexual abuse victims to meet the federal standards of admissibility).
" Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Miss. 1990).
"See FED. R. EvID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.").
Although the admissibility of expert testimony on CSAAS is governed by state law, the federal
rules will be used as illustrations since many states, including Kentucky, model their rules of
evidence after the federal rules.
" Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
[Vol. 81
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Once the materiality and probativeness of the evidence are established,
courts must then determine if the value of the evidence is outweighed by
its costs in terms of unfair prejudice to tlie defendant and considerations
of judicial economy.49
Jurisdictions continue to disagree on the relevancy of expert
testimony on CSAAS. While some jurisdictions find the testimony to be
irrelevant because "it does not render the desired inference more probable
than not,"5 others have admitted the testimony as relevant to the issue
of the child's credibility." Even among those jurisdictions that consider
expert testimony on CSAAS to be relevant, the question turns to whether
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact to the
defendant. Important, competing factors in this regard include the
tendency for juries to attribute an "aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness" 52 to experts, and the belief that expert testimony is
necessary because a child's reactions to sexual abuse are not within the
common knowledge of jurors.53
In addition to the general relevance requirement imposed on all
evidence, many courts require that expert testimony on CSAAS satisfy an
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401; see also 1
McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 774-75 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992) (explaining
that "[a] fact that is 'ofconsequence' is material, and evidence that affects the probability that a fact
is as a party claims it to be has probative force" (footnote omitted)).
" See FED. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."). Considerations of judicial economy are particularly important in evaluating expert
testimony on CSAAS because Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows an expert to testify as to
"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge [only if his testimony] will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. EviD. 702. Expert testimony is
therefore excluded if it is "unhelpful[,] ... superfluous and a waste of time." FED. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee's note (citing 7 JOHN H. WiGMOmE EVIDENCE IN TRLus AT COMMON LAW §
1918 (James H. Chadboum ed. rev. 1978)).
Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. 1992).
s' See People v. Housley, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 437 (Ct. App. 1992) (admitting testimony to
rehabilitate the victim's credibility after the child recanted her claim of abuse).
2 State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985) (quoting United States v. Armaral, 488 F.2d
1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)).
" United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 419-20 (8th Cir. 1987); Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d
1138, 1139 (Ala. 1989); People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439, 442 (I11. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied,
567 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. 1991); People v. Wellman, 560 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (App. Div. 1990), appeal
denied, 578 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1991). Contra Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836 (Pa.
1992) (holding that expert testimony explaining why a sexually abused child would delay reporting
the incident, omit details, and provide inconsistent testimony is inadmissible as being "easily
understood by lay people and ... not requir[ing] expert analysis"); State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d
186, 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that jurors did not need expert testimony on CSAAS in
order to decide the case).
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additional standard of admissibility known as the Frye standard, first
articulated in Frye v. United States.' The Frye standard governs the
admissibility of expert testimony that is based on novel scientific
evidence and requires that, in order to admit "expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.""5
Courts that apply the Frye standard to expert testimony on CSAAS
find that because the psychological research on child sexual abuse has not
revealed a "syndrome" common to child sexual abuse victims,56 CSAAS
has not been "generally accepted." Thus, failure to satisfy the Frye
standard is an oft-cited ground for ruling expert testimony on CSAAS
inadmissible.57
The advantages of applying the Frye standard are that it reserves the
task of determining the reliability of scientific evidence to the experts,
ensures the availability of a sufficient number of experts to testify about
the evidence's reliability in an adversarial proceeding, promotes uniformi-
ty of decision, and excludes unreliable evidence.58 Despite the benefits
of the Frye standard, however, it has been heavily criticized as being too
vague' and too conservative," particularly in regard to expert testimo-
ny on psychological evidence such as CSAAS.61
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
" Id. at 1014.
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Dunlde, 602 A.2d 830, 833-34 (Pa. 1992); State v. Dickerson, 789 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990); cf. State v. Stallings, 419 S.E.2d 586, 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (noting the lack of any
evidence in the record that the expert testimony on CSAAS met the Frye standard of general
acceptability). But see Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that
"[t]hrough our independent research, we find the syndrome to be valid and without medical dissent").
5, See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985); Myers et al., supra note
14, at 28 n.88.
" The following questions, raised by the Frye standard, illustrate the standard's vagueness:
When is evidence scientific? What is the "particular field" to which a scientific principle
or application belongs? What is meant by "general acceptance" within the relevant field?
How does one prove general acceptance? Finally, when an expert's testimony is based on
the novel application of a scientific principle, must the proponent establish the reliability
of the underlying principle as well as the application?
Myers et al., supra note 14, at 24.
"See, e-g., Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236 ("Under Frye, some have argued, courts may be required
to exclude much probative and reliable information from the jury's consideration, thereby
unnecessarily impeding the truth-seeking function of litigation.").
" One justification for not applying the Frye standard to expert testimony on CSAAS is that,
as psychological evidence, CSAAS is not as easily quantifiable as other types of scientific evidence.
Holmes, supra note 14, at 151. Another problem is that since experts on CSAAS are not limited to
one "particular field," the Frye standard could require proof of general acceptance among all relevant
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In response to the criticisms of the Frye standard, some jurisdictions
have admitted expert testimony on CSAAS by applying an alternative to
the Frye standard known as the "relevance analysis."'62 Under the
relevance analysis, general scientific acceptance of CSAAS is just one of
the factors63 a court may consider in evaluating the reliability and
probative value of the CSAAS evidence. Upon determining that the
CSAAS evidence has probative value, the court bases its decision on the
admissibility of the evidence on the traditional- procedure of weighing the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial impact on the
defendant."
If expert testimony on CSAAS is deemed to be relevant and
admissible under the applicable standard, then the testimony is
presented to a jury.6' A common concern that courts have with admitting
expert testimony on CSAAS is that the testimony may interfere with a
jury's fact-finding function, including a jury's decisions on credibility
issues." Expert testimony on CSAAS may impermissibly influence a
jury in two ways. First, jurors may defer to the opinions of the expert in
order to avoid having to draw their own conclusions.' Second, the
expert may testify, either directly or indirectly, on the child's truthful-
ness.. Recognizing these potential problems, some jurisdictions rule
expert testimony on CSAAS inadmissible on the basis that admission of
such testimony denies the defendant his right to a fair trial."'
fields, such as social work, psychology, and psychiatry. Id. at 151-52; see also People v. Beckley,
456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990) (holding the Frye standard inapplicable to expert testimony on
the behavioral sciences when the prosecution uses the testimony to explain a particular behavior).
"See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237 (stating that satisfaction of the Frye standard was neither
necessary nor sufficient for admissibility); Myers et al., supra note 14, at 29-32; Holmes, supra note
14, at 153-56.
" For a list of other factors a court may consider, see Myers et al., supra note 14, at 30-32, and
Holmes, supra note 14, at 153 n.79.
1 McCoRmCK ON EvmENE supra note 48, § 203, at 873-75.
,See Monique K. Cirelli, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Helpful or
Prejudicial? People v. Beckley, 8 COOLEY L. Rlv. 425, 445-49 (1991) (discussing the problems of
jury overreliance on expert testimony and improper bolstering of the child's credibility).
" Id. at 445-47.
4Id.
" Id. at 448-49.
In 1982, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that an expert testifying about the typical
characteristics of child sexual abuse victims could also testify as to his opinion of the child's
believability. State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334-35 (Haw. 1982). The Hawaii high court overruled
Kim in State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48, 54 (Haw. 1990), and the rule currently adhered to by
practically all jurisdictions prohibits an expert from testifying directly as to the child's credibility.
Cirelli, supra note 65, at 448.
" E.g., Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 604
A.2d 248 (Pa. 1992).
1992-93]
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II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CSAAS
A. Admission of Expert Testimony on CSAAS
While the proponents for admitting expert testimony on CSAAS
emphasize the numerous proof problems common to child sexual abuse
cases,7" courts also necessarily recognize that child sexual abuse cases
are as difficult to defend as they are to prosecute.7 In an attempt to
protect the interests of both the victim and the defendant, the majority of
jurisdictions have held that expert testimony on CSAAS is admissible.
The jurisdictions vary, however, on the degree of specificity allowed and
the appropriate use of such expert testimony.
A few jurisdictions allow the expert to testify only in general terms
regarding the characteristics of CSAAS; the expert is therefore not
permitted to relate the elements of CSAAS to any specific behaviors
exhibited by the victim. 7  Courts that have adopted this approach
consider sexual abuse to be outside a juror's common experience. Thus,
expert testimony on CSAAS is admitted to help the jurors better
understand the subject.74 Although permitted to give general background
information about CSAAS, the expert may not refer specifically to the
victim's behavior due to the potential for the testimony to become an
"impermissible comment on the child's credibility.
' 75
A second approach adopted by some jurisdictions concerning the
admissibility of CSAAS testimony is to allow the expert to testify
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
"State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48, 53-54 (Haw. 1990).
"See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
"Hammock v. State, 411 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d
655, 660 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); see also Batangan, 799 P.2d at 52 (holding that once the expert
has testified regarding the general characteristics of sexual abuse victims, "[t]hejury is fully capable,
on its own, of making the connection to the facts of the particular case," such as the specific
behaviors of the victim); State v. Svihl, 490 N.W.2d 269, 273 (S.D. 1992) (stating that limiting expert.
testimony to general traits and characteristics is the "better practice"). But see Commonwealth v.
Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 831 (Pa. 1992) (holding the admission of expert testimony reversible error
even though the expert never related her general testimony on CSAAS to the specific behaviors of
the victim).
" See State v. Catsam, 534 A.2d 184, 187 (Vt. 1987) (holding that expert testimony in child
sexual abuse cases provides jurors with "a better understanding of the emotional antecedents of the
victim's conduct').
" See State v. Sims, 608 A.2d 1149, 1154 (Vt 1991). Although the Vermont Supreme Court
has not prohibited experts from referring to the victim's behavior, the court noted that it has
"repeatedly found use of particularized testimony to be error." Id. See also People v. Housley, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding that expert who had never met the victim and who limited
her testimony to explaining the general behavior of sexual abuse victims did not opine on the victim's
credibility).
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regarding both the general characteristics of CSAAS and the specific
behaviors that the expert observed in the victim.76 The rationale
behind this more liberal approach is that once the jury hears testimony
regarding the general characteristics of CSAAS and the symptoms
exhibited by the victim, the jury possesses the knowledge necessary
to determine whether or not the abuse actually occurred.77
Finally, while some jurisdictions focus on the specificity of the
expert testimony, other jurisdictions, such as California78 and
Michigan,79 merely examine the prosecution's purpose in presenting
the expert testimony. These jurisdictions recognize the usefulness to
the jury of expert testimony on CSAAS but limit its use to "rebutting
an inference that a complainant's postincident behavior was inconsis-
tent with that of an actual victim of sexual abuse, incest or rape.""
Since the use of the testimony is limited to rehabilitating the witness,
expert testimony on CSAAS is admissible only after the defense has
attacked the victim's credibility." The court may also attempt to
prevent the misuse of testimony through a jury instruction stating
"that the expert's testimony is not intended and should not be used to
determine whether the victim's molestation claim is true."' Such a
"limited admissibility" approach83 protects both the victim's interest in
not having her behavior misinterpreted by the jury, and the defendant's
interest in not having expert testimony on CSAAS used as affirmative
proof of abuse.
, See Calloway v. State, 520 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Cohn v. State, 804
S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); cf. State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 604, 611-12 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (holding that expert testimony that the victim exhibits signs of CSAAS is only admissible in
cases where the victim is "very young" and not competent to testify). But see People v. Knupp, 579
N.Y.S.2d 801, 802-03 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that expert testimony that victims exhibited
symptoms of CSAAS was impermissible attempt to prove the defendant's guilt).
Allison v. State, 353 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987).
nE.g., People v. Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Ct. App. 1988).
E.g., People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990).
Id. at 399 (quoting People v. Becdey, 409 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Mich. CL App. 1987)).
"People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (I11. Ct. App. 1990) (justifying the use of evidence in
rebuttal when the "defendant's own actions have necessitated the use of syndrome testimony"), appeal
denied, 567 N.E.2d 339 (Il1. 1991); cf. Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 659 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991) (allowing expert testimony as direct evidence once the child has put her own credibility in
issue by retracting her allegation on the stand).
n Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 892. A subsequent California decision required that this limiting
instruction be a sua sponte instruction. See People v. Housley, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 437 (Ct. App.
1992); see also State v. Stallings, 419 S.E.2d 586, 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (limiting instruction
necessary to ensure that the jury use the evidence for corroborative, as opposed to substantive,
purposes).
" See 1 McCoR.MICK ON EVIDENcE, supra note 48, § 59 (discussing the use of the "limited
admissibility" approach when evidence may be admissible for one purpose, but not for another).
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B. Rejection of Expert Testimony on CSAAS
Despite the various approaches for admitting expert testimony on
CSAAS, there are jurisdictions that consistently reject such testimony.
When courts survey the various approaches that previously have been
taken concerning expert testimony on CSAAS, Kentucky's approach is
often cited as an example of the minority view.' Kentucky represents
the extreme in that Kentucky courts reject all types of expert testimony
on CSAAS. Thus, the testimony is prohibited even when the expert limits
his testimony to one or more of the individual symptoms of CSAAS, and
refrains from labeling the symptom as a component of a "syndrome.8 5
Kentucky first addressed the issue of the admissibility of expert
testimony on CSAAS in Bussey v. Commonwealth." The appellant
in Busgey was convicted of attempted first-degree sodomy.' Part of
the prosecution's case consisted of a psychiatrist's testimony regarding
the common symptoms of "the 'relatively new' concept" of CSAAS,ss
as well as the psychiatrist's expert opinion that the victim exhibited
such symptoms."' However, the expert acknowledged his inability to
conclude either that the victim's symptoms were a direct result of the
alleged abuse, or that the victim's symptoms were the unique result
of sexual abuse by the appellant, as opposed to someone else.9"
The Supreme Court of Kentucky found that admission of the
psychiatrist's testimony constituted reversible error for two reasons.
First, the prosecution did not establish that CSAAS is "generally
accepted in the medical community.""' Second, the expert testimony
was "immaterial as to the establishment of the appellant's guilt"
because the expert could not connect the existence of the syndrome
to the alleged abuse by the appellant.'
14 See Nelson, 561 N.E.2d at 443; State v. Dodson, 452 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)
(Habhab, J., concurring); State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert.
granted, 606 A.2d 372 (NJ. 1992); cf State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1989) xamining the Kentucky and Missouri approaches to expert testimony on CSAAS).
See infr notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
697 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1985).
Id. at 140-41.
'Id. at 140.
"Id.
Id. at 141. The fact that the psychiatrist could not distinguish symptoms of the victim that
might have resulted from sexual abuse by someone other than the appellant was of particular
importance in this case. There was evidence presented at trial that the victim had also been sexually
abused by her uncles. Id.
,Id.; see supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
Bussey, 697 S.W.2d at 141.
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In the year following the Bussey decision, the Kentucky Supreme
Court was again faced with a child sexual abuse case in which the
prosecution presented expert testimony relating the general characteristics
of CSAAS to the specific behavior of the victim. In Lantrip v. Common-
wealth,93 the expert witness testified that the victim's behavior was
consistent with four of the five elements of CSAAS.' In holding that
admission of the expert's testimony was reversible error, the court applied
the rationale of Bussey. The court emphasized that even if CSAAS were
generally accepted, evidence that the victim exhibited such symptoms
would not prove, by itself, that the victim had been sexually abused.95
Rather, "there would remain the question of whether other children who
had not been similarly abused might also develop the same symptoms or
traits."96
The decisions in Bussey and Lantrip illustrate Kentucky's rejection of
expert testimony on CSAAS when the evidence consists of both general
testimony on the syndrome and the expert's observation of the victim's
specific characteristics. The alternative approach then taken by Kentucky
prosecutors was to limit the expert's testimony to only the general
elements of the syndrome. For example, in Hester v. Commonwealth,97
the expert testified that children normally do not disclose specific details
of an alleged incident of sexual abuse unless they have actually experi-
enced the abuse," and gave reasons why children in general often recant
allegations of sexual abuse.99 Additionally, an expert in Mitchell v.
Commonwealth"°0 testified as to the general psychological reaction of
child sexual abuse victims, but she never specifically related her
testimony to any of the victims.''
Both Mitchell and Hester were subsequently reversed due to the
admission of the experts' generalized testimony on CSAAS. In Mitchell,
the court reiterated its belief that evidence on CSAAS was not relevant
to the issue of the appellant's guilt or innocence, and that it failed to
satisfy the Frye standard. 02 In Hester, on the other hand, the court
"713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986).
"Id. at 817. The one element that the victim had not exhibited was retraction. Id. For a
discussion of the elements of CSAAS, see supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
Lantrip, 713 S.W.2d at 817.
"Id.
"734 S.W.2d 457 (Ky.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987).
"Id. at 458.
"Id. Children may recant sexual abuse allegations "because the family has put pressure on them
either verbally, or by their actions to be loyal to the family." Id.
777 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1989).
Id. at 932.
Id. at 933.
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raised the additional concern that expert testimony on CSAAS invades the
province of the jury.0 3 Since the children in Hester had recanted their
allegations in court, "[t]he admission of the expert opinion was improper
as it, in effect, told the jury to believe the story the children had initially
told and disbelieve the testimony given in open court."'" As such, the
testimony constituted an impermissible comment on the ultimate issue
before the jury. 5
The Hester case is distinguishable from the prior cases on CSAAS in
Kentucky in that the expert never referred to a "Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome" during her testimony.' However, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has found this distinction to be immaterial. In
Kentucky's two most recent cases involving expert testimony on CSAAS,
the prosecution purposefully limited the expert's testimony to the
individual symptoms of CSAAS °7 Despite the fact that the experts
never mentioned a syndrome, the court ruled that the admission of the
testimony was reversible error. According to the court, "[n]either the
syndrome nor the symptoms that comprise the syndrome have recognized
reliability in diagnosing child sexual abuse as a scientific entity.' ' 08
IV. ANALYSIS OF KENTUCKY'S APPROACH TO
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CSAAS
A. Background
As courts in other jurisdictions continue to struggle with the issue of
admissibility of expert testimony on CSAAS, an analysis of Kentucky's
established law can serve as a source of guidance. The Kentucky
decisions are based on the resolution of three evidentiary issues that arise
when expert testimony on CSAAS is presented in child sexual abuse
cases.0 9 First, the Kentucky Supreme Court has determined that expert
, ' Hester, 734 S.W.2d at 458.
lu Id.
I' Id. at 459; see also Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 613-14 (Ky. 1992) (holding
that it was reversible error for expert testifying on CSAAS to express his opinion that the
complainant was a victim of intrafamily sexual abuse).
I" Hester, 734 S.W.2d at 458.
"' Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1992) (expert testified that delayed
disclosure is a common occurrence in child sexual abuse cases); Brown v. Commonwealth, 812
S.W.2d 502, 503 (Ky. 1991) (expert testified as to "whether the victim's behavior was 'consistent with
abuse"' without specifically referring to CSAAS).
I" Hellstrom, 825 S.W.2d at 614.
' See supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
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testimony on CSAAS fails to meet the Frye standard of admissibility."'
Second, the court has ruled that expert testimony on CSAAS is not
relevant to the issue of the appellant's guilt or innocence."' Finally, the
Kentucky high court has held that testimony concerning CSAAS invades
the province of the jury."'
B. The Frye Standard
Despite numerous criticisms of the Frye standard,"' its "general
acceptance" test is the requisite standard of admissibility in Kentucky for
novel scientific evidence."' Kentucky courts recognized the Frye
standard as early as 1960,"' and have applied the standard to such
evidence as truth serum tests,"6 Human Leukocyte Antigen blood
tests," 7 expert testimony on "battered wife syndrome,""'  and profile
evidence of a pedophile in a child sexual abuse case."9 There is,
however, one notable case in which the Kentucky Supreme Court did not
apply the Frye standard-Brown v. Commonwealth.'20
In Brown, the court admitted evidence concerning a novel blood test,
despite the fact that the evidence had "not yet come into general
acceptance and use.'' The court apparently applied a standard of
admissibility similar to the relevance analysis," treating the novelty of
the blood test as one factor to consider in evaluating the evidence's
credibility, not its admissibility.'" However, the application of an
alternative standard of admissibility to novel scientific evidence in Brown
' Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ky. 1985).
" Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Ky. 1989); Bussey, 697 S.W.2d at 141.
H ester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Ky.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987).
... See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
I" See ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE KENTucKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 12.35, at 429 (2d ed.
1984).
"' Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1960).
... Id. (holding that the tests "have not attained sufficient scientific recognition of dependability
and reliability').
.. Perry v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kessinger, 652 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Ky. 1983).
... Commonwealth v. Rose, 725 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987) (holding that battered wife syndrome is
a mental condition, and that only psychiatrists and clinical psychologists may be qualified to testify
as experts on the syndrome), overruled by Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 388-89 (Ky.
1990) (holding that battered wife syndrome is not a mental condition, and therefore expert testimony
on the syndrome need not come from a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist).
Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647, 653 (Ky. 1991).
" 639 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983).
Id. at 760.
See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
W Brown, 639 S.W.2d at 760.
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should not be read as a rejection of the Frye standard.24 The Kentucky
Supreme Court has since specifically acknowledged that expert testimony
on CSAAS must satisfy the Frye standard of admissibility."z
Kentucky's conclusion that CSAAS does not meet the Frye standard
is supported by the research on the subject, which indicates that the
concept of a "syndrome" common to sexual abuse victims has not gained
general acceptance. 6 In fact, there is little disagreement, even among
proponents of admitting expert testimony on CSAAS, that the evidence
is not generally accepted for the purpose of proving that abuse oc-
curred.'27 Thus, the majority of jurisdictions that allow expert testimony
on CSAAS must do so by rejecting the Frye standard and adopting an
alternative admissibility standard. Since Kentucky vigorously adheres to
the Frye standard when faced with expert testimony on CSAAS, the
CSAAS testimony has been correctly ruled inadmissible.
C. Relevance
The second ground on which Kentucky rejects expert testimony on
CSAAS is that the testimony is not relevant evidence. The standard for
determining the relevancy of expert testimony in Kentucky follows that
of the federal courts.' The evidence must tend "to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"'" and
must be helpful to the jury.130 The Kentucky Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected expert testimony on CSAAS because it is not relevant
to the issue of the appellant's guilt or innocence."
"3 See LAWSON, supra note 114, § 6.10, at 47-48 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
See Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647, 653 (Ky. 1991). In determining the
admissibility of profile evidence of a pedophile, the court stated that it had reversed previous child
sexual abuse cases in which expert testimony on CSAAS had been admitted because "the evidence
was insuflicient to admit the evidence under the 'Frye' test." Id.
" See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. See also Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d
830, 832-39 (Pa. 1992), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined a large amount of the
existing literature on the subject and ruled that CSAAS failed to satisfy the Frye standard.
"3 See State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1991) (holding that while
"CSAAS evidence is generally reliable to explain secrecy, belated disclosure, and recantation ... [it]
is not reliable to prove that sexual abuse, in fact, occurred"), cert. granted, 606 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1992).
" See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
,. KY. 1R EVID. 401.
13 Ky. R. EVID. 702.
.. See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Ky. 1989); Bussey v. Commonwealth,
697 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ky. 1985); see also Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky.
1986) (recognizing that if children who have not been sexually abused may also exhibit the
symptoms of CSAAS, then "the development of [CSAAS] symptoms or traits... would not suffice,
1992-931 CHILD SExUAL ABUSE
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has correctly recognized that
CSAAS evidence is not probative of abuse, the court has ignored the fact
that the appellant's guilt or innocence is not the only fact that is of
consequence in a criminal proceeding. As one commentator has noted,
"[i]t should be obvious that evidence may be relevant because it bears
logically upon the credibility of witnesses or the probativeness of other
admitted evidence."'"2 Expert testimony on CSAAS is relevant to the
issue of the credibility of the victim, especially when the defense has
presented evidence on the victim's behavior in order to attack her
credibility. Consequently, the Kentucky Supreme Court should first
examine the context in which expert testimony on CSAAS is presented
before automatically dismissing the evidence as irrelevant.
D. Invading the Province of the Jury"'
The context in which expert testimony on CSAAS is presented is also
critical in determining whether the testimony invades the province of the
jury. Of the six Kentucky cases involving expert testimony on
CSAAS, 4 the Kentucky Supreme Court has reversed only two on the
per se, to prove the fact of sexual abuse").
.. LAWSON, supra note 114, § 2.00, at 6 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
. An objection that expert opinion testimony invades the province of the jury stems from the
traditional ultimate fact doctrine, which prohibits experts from opining on the "ultimate fact" in issue
in the case. See 1 McCoRMIcK ON EvIDENCE, supra note 48, § 12. This absolute bar on ultimate
issue testimony has been removed by Federal Rule of Evidence 704, which states that "testimony in
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact" FFD. R. EVID. 704(a).
Kentucky has not adopted a rule comparable to Federal Rule 704. Consequently, Kentucky case
law governs the determination as to whether expert opinion testimony may be excluded solely on the
basis that it embraces an ultimate fact. See LAWSON, supra note 114, § 6.20, at 53-57 (2d ed. Supp.
1989) (describing the "three stages of life" of the ultimate fact doctrine in Kentucky). The Kentucky
courts have both excluded expert opinion testimony based on the ultimate fact doctrine, and admitted
expert opinion testimony despite the fact that the testimony relates to an ultimate fact. Compare
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Ky. 1985) ("An opinion as to whether the
accused had the ability or propensity to commit such an act is improper because it is an opinion on
the ultimate fact, that is, innocence or guilt. Consequently, it invades the province of the jury.") with
Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 771 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Ky. 1989) (holding in a criminal abuse case that
opinion testimony that the injuries were intentionally caused did not invade the province of the jury,
because "[o]pinion testimony is admissible where it appears that the trier of fact would be assisted
in the solution of the ultimate problem."). In light of Kentucky's inconsistent decisions on the
ultimate fact doctrine, "[t]he most definite statement one can make about the state of the law at this
time is the following: Opinion testimony may be inadmissible in some instances because the opinion
embraces an ultimate fact" LAWSoN, supra note 114, § 6.20, at 57 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
" Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1992); Brown v. Commonwealth, 812
S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1991); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1989); Hester v.
Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457 (Ky.), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); Lantrip v. Common-
wealth, 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986); Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1985).
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ground that the expert either improperly commented on the child's credibility
or opined on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence."3 The fact that the
Kentucky Supreme Court failed to address the issue of whether the expert
testimony invaded the province of the jury in all six cases indicates that
expert testimony on CSAAS will not always interfere with the jury's fact-
finding function.'36 Such interference apparently arises only when the expert
goes beyond providing background information on CSAAS and expressly or
implicitly opines as to whether the child was a victim of sexual abuse.37
For example, the expert in Hester, in addition to explaining why a child
might recant an allegation of sexual abuse, stated that when children "have
given specific details [regarding the sexual abuse] to adults, generally-well
almost universally this has happened to them."' " Since the expert implicitly
conveyed her opinion that the child was in fact sexually abused, rather than
merely providing the jury with information to aid them in making a decision,
the court held that the expert's testimony invaded the province of the jury."
E. Synopsis
Of the Kentucky Supreme Court's three separate reasons for not admitting
expert testimony on CSAAS, the testimony's failure to meet the Frye standard
will apply to every case in which this novel scientific evidence is presented.
Whether expert testimony on CSAAS is irrelevant and invades the province
of the jury, however, will depend on the specific content of the expert's
testimony in each particular case. Thus, if expert testimony on CSAAS, or its
elements, were to meet the Frye standard, the evidence would be admissible
in Kentucky under certain circumstances.
V. A NEw APPROACH FOR KENTUCKY
The failure of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome to
satisfy the Frye standard should not lead Kentucky courts to exclude
expert testimony about a certain behavior of child sexual abuse victims
15 See Hellstrom, 825 S.W.2d at 614 (finding that the expert "invaded the province of the jury
by determining witness credibility and expressing his unqualified opinion on the ultimate issue");
Hester, 734 S.W.2d at 459 ("Expert opinion which purports to resolve the ultimate issue before the
jury is inadmissible.").
See supra notes 86-108 and accompanying text.
"'See Myers et al., supra note 14, at 65 ("[Tihere is a meaningful distinction between expert
testimony that a particular child was sexually abused, and expert testimony that a child demonstrates
behaviors commonly observed in the class of sexually abused children. In the latter case, the expert
does not offer a direct opinion on the ultimate question of whether abuse occurred.").
" Hester, 734 S.W.2d at 458.
"' Id. at 459.
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for the sole reason that the behavior also happens to be a symptom of
CSAAS."' Rather, when faced with expert testimony on separate
symptoms of CSAAS, the court should determine the admissibility of
each individual symptom, respectively. Under this proposed approach,
expert testimony concerning the tendency of child sexual abuse victims
to delay disclosure and retract their accusations should generally be
admissible in Kentucky to rebut an attack on the child's credibility.
By limiting the expert's testimony to the symptoms of delayed
disclosure and retraction, such evidence would satisfy the Frye standard.
Delayed disclosure and retraction are distinguishable from the CSAAS
symptoms of secrecy, helplessness and accommodation in that the latter
three symptoms are perceived as common reactions of a child to any
stress or trauma, such as a divorce or a death in the family. The process
by which a child reports an incident of sexual abuse, on the other hand,
is more likely to result from an actual sexual abuse experience than from
some other source of general stress. 4 ' Moreover, research independent
of that on CSAAS indicates that delayed disclosure and retraction are
generally accepted in the scientific field as possible responses of a child
to sexual abuse.42
One potential problem with admitting expert testimony on delayed
disclosure and retraction is that the evidence necessary to establish these
behaviors as generally accepted is normally presented in the form of
statistical probabilities. The use of statistics invokes the danger that the
jury may interpret them as quantifying the victim's credibility.'43 In
order to avoid this problem, Kentucky courts should hold an in camera
hearing in which the expert can inform the court of the available research on
the subject. Further, when testifying in front of a jury, an expert's testimony
" This scenario is distinguishable from one in which the expert testifies as to all of the
symptoms comprising CSAAS, but does not label them as a "syndrome." Since testimony on all of
the symptoms of CSAAS is essentially the same as testimony on CSAAS, Kentucky should not admit
the evidence simply because the expert never used the word "syndrome."
4, See Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 273 (Del. 1987) (describing delayed disclosure and
retraction as two symptoms that are "especially linked to intrafamily child rape").
This statement is not intended to suggest that a child who alleges that she has been sexually
abused is always telling the truth, for children do lie about sexual abuse. However, studies have
shown that the false allegation rate for reports of child sexual abuse is only between two percent and
eight percent. Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, False Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Children
and Adolescents, 28 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOL. Psy. 230, 234 (1989).
,, See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
' See Wheat, 527 A.2d at 274-75 (likening expert testimony on recantation that is couched in
terms of statistical probabilities to "lie detector" testimony). For example, an expert who testifies as
to research results in which 93% of the victims who recanted eventually reaffirmed their allegations
is invading the province of the jury by implicitly placing the complainant who has recanted her
allegation in the "group of 'false' recanters." Id.
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should be limited to the fact that it is not uncommon for child sexual abuse
victims to delay reporting the abuse or to recant their allegations at some
point. This approach will avoid the possibility of a jury incorrectly applying
statistical probabilities cited by the expert to their own evaluation of the
victim's credibility.
To ensure that the expert's testimony is relevant, Kentucky courts
should admit expert testimony on delayed disclosure and retraction only
to rebut a defense attack on the victim's credibility. Once the defense has
specifically pointed out that the victim either delayed reporting the
incident or has since recanted her allegation, the victim's credibility
becomes a fact that is of consequence to the proceeding, and expert
testimony should be admitted to explain this behavior.
If the expert were limited to testifying that delayed disclosure and
retraction are not uncommon in child sexual abuse victims, as opposed
to saying that delayed disclosure and retraction are indicators of child
sexual abuse, admitting the testimony would not unfairly prejudice the
defendant.'" Furthermore, the evidence would not frustrate the goals of
judicial economy, because jurors do not understand that these actions by
the child do not have the same meaning as they would with other types
of crime victims. Since the probative value of the testimony would
normally outweigh its prejudicial impact on the defendant, expert
testimony on delayed disclosure and retraction that is limited to rebuttal
purposes would be admissible as to the issue of the victim's credibility.
The main obstacle to admitting this otherwise relevant evidence is the
danger that the jury will misuse the evidence.' In order to prevent the
jury from misinterpreting the evidence, Kentucky should follow the lead
of California' and instruct the jury as to the proper use of expert
testimony on delayed disclosure and retraction.
CONCLUSION
There is no question about the seriousness of the problem of child
sexual abuse and the need to find effective ways of combatting the
problem. Nonetheless, even though Kentucky's current refusal to admit
1" See Cohen, supra note 14, at 446, in which the author recognizes that "[t]here is something
fundamentally strange about saying that since the child denies that the event occurred, it must have
occurred," id., but also suggests that expert testimony on retraction may be appropriate for certain
rehabilitative purposes. Id. at 158 n.110.
" For example, the jury could mistakenly assume that since it is not unusual for child sexual
abuse victims either to delay reporting the incident or to recant their allegations, the complainant's
display of these behaviors indicates that she was abused.
'" See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 81
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
expert testimony on CSAAS makes it more difficult for the prosecution
to obtain a conviction, this fact alone is not sufficient justification for
Kentucky to admit expert testimony on CSAAS. As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Dunkle:47
We are all aware that child abuse is a plague in our society and one of
the saddest aspects of growing up in today's America. Nevertheless, we
do not think it befits this Court to simply disregard long-standing
principles concerning the presumption of innocence and the proper
admission of evidence in order to gain a greater number of convictions.
A conviction must be obtained through the proper and lawful admission
of evidence in order to maintain the integrity and fairness that is the
bedrock of our jurisprudence.' "
In Kentucky, the admission of expert testimony on CSAAS is both
improper and unlawful in that the evidence fails the Frye standard of
admissibility, can be irrelevant, and may invade the province of the jury.
However, the admission of expert testimony on delayed disclosure and
retraction in child sexual abuse cases in order to rebut a defense attack
on the victim's credibility, coupled with a limiting instruction to the jury,
would successfully combat the problem of child sexual abuse as well as
maintain the integrity and fairness of the Kentucky judicial system.
Michele Meyer McCarthy
1,7 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
I, d. at 838.
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